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In a liberal democracy such as Canada, constitutional protection for the right to 
free speech, press and expression provides citizens with the power to begin the 
process of changing things in society which they do not like. But there is also an 
element in society, consisting largely of sociopathic malcontents, who have taken 
it upon themselves to manipulate the privileges of these freedoms to abrogate the 
rights of recognizable communities in a pluralistic society. To what extent this 
philistine element should be tolerated is a question that gnaws continuously at the 
conscience of every good civil libertarian.
Those fundamental freedoms found in s. 2(b) of the Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms1 allow Canadians to vent frustration against certain authorities without 
fear of physical, judicial or other discriminatory reprisals. The rights to free 
association, speech, expression and the press were largely taken for granted before 
1982. Practitioners were obliged then to entrust Parliament with the responsibility 
to refrain from making laws that would limit these freedoms.
Since the mid-1970s, Canadians in several provinces have been faced with a 
small number of orators, publishers and demagogues who have grabbed much 
more than their allotted 15 minutes of fame in expounding beliefs and ideology 
which have as their main purpose the promotion of hate against an identifiable 
group in our multicultural society. Their speeches, pamphlets and books have a 
limited audience, but the ends they espouse affect everyone in any open society.
While hate propaganda has remained a small cottage industry mostly 
dependent on imported scripts from the United States and abroad, not even the 
most established of democracies can ignore its objectives. It promotes conflict in 
a society where we have tried for over a century to maintain harmony within a 
multicultural context based on egalitarian social values. Yet limiting free speech 
or expression in any way is like drawing a double-edged sword which can inflict 
painful wounds on those one does not wish to challenge. Our continuously 
evolving social values are constantly engaged in a struggle to overcome the more 
ugly aspects of our instinctive libertarian values, such as those fostering the right 
of free expression with no strings attached.
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Two school teachers from opposite ends of the country have run up large legal 
bills in their attempt to have our libertarian values prevail. Jim Keegstra and 
Malcolm Ross have interpreted the Charter as allowing them to publish and 
distribute material which promotes the theory of a Zionist conspiracy intent on 
world domination. Their books also deny that one of the most catastrophic 
genocide campaigns in world history ever occurred (a campaign, ironically, fuelled 
by venal hatred against a religious minority in Europe).
Our courts have concluded, with good reason, that historical revisionism which 
purports to deny the existence of a European Holocaust exists for the purposes of 
inciting hatred against Jews. What they have yet to decide is whether the 
distribution of this literature contravenes ss. 318 to 320 of our Criminal Code.2 
More specifically, they have yet to agree whether these sections of the Criminal 
Code are inconsistent with ss. 2(a) and 2(b) of the Charter, not to mention s. 13 
of the Canadian Human Rights A ct3 and related provincial acts. Nor have they 
yet arrived at an adequate definition of the word “wilfully” in s. 281(2) of the 
Criminal Code as it pertains to information exchanged in a public forum intended 
to whip up racial, cultural or religious animosity.
No matter how odious and offensive a person’s views might seem, we doubt 
there is a judge or commissioner alive who really wants to accept the burden of 
knowingly curtailing someone else’s constitutional right to speak freely. Media 
coverage of both the Ross inquiry and the Keegstra trial has failed miserably in 
most cases to explain the societal ramifications that could surface in the event of 
a spate of hate literature convictions. It has mostly focused attention on a battle 
of good (the oppressed minority group) against evil (the accused hatemonger). In 
many cases, special interest groups claiming to represent the struggles of both 
good and evil play a large role in commenting on the trials and hearings, yet they 
hardly contribute much to the dispensation of justice and fairness. They have a 
vested interest in the outcome of such trials and aren’t about to concede their 
involvments are anything less than completely disinterested. And who can argue 
with them in the theatre of the absurd which often prevails in simplistic 
confrontations associated with good and evil?
Having made a conscious (and wise) decision to grant equal protection under 
the law in s. 15 of the Charter, our national legislators have also committed 
themselves to ridding society of elements that could infringe upon that protection. 
Publishers and authors who wish to disguise their views of racial, religious or 
cultural superiority of one group over another as scholarly inquiry pose a special 
threat. Usually, their work is not riddled with the vulgar rhetoric and imagery we
2R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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have come to associate with traditional hatemongering tribes like the Ku Klux 
Klan. Often, books such as Ross’ Spectre o f Power1' are quite well written and no 
more lacking in scholarly reference than a mediocre study of salmon mating habits. 
Yet it is this very type of hate promotion that most threatens the protection 
granted in s. 15 because it comes from people like Ross and Keegstra who were 
respected members of their community charged with educating children.
In the final analysis, our rights to free speech and expression are constrained 
by s. 1 of the Charter, “reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.” While it is obviously reasonable to 
outlaw cross-burnings as an expression of one’s view of racial equality, literature 
and classroom lectures are not what we consider to be traditional venues for 
promoting hatred.
Hard core proponents of free speech emanating from the John Stuart Mill 
school of political philosophy are quick to point out that any conviction handed 
down under ss. 318 to 320 and 281(2) of the Criminal Code would allow the courts 
to begin to define “reasonable limits.” The well-documented growth of the 
political correctness movement on Canadian university campuses has led to the 
deployment of descriptive nouns like “racist,” “sexist” and “fascist” in a very 
liberal manner. This type of behaviour in a tolerant society may not be conducive 
to cultural understanding, but no matter how unpleasant, it does not have the full 
effect or penalty of a criminal conviction.
However, the number of convictions handed out by the courts and human 
rights tribunals are very few, and many of those have been appealed successfully 
to appellate courts. The cases of Jim Keegstra and Malcolm Ross illustrate well 
the limp-wristed impact of current legislation in curbing the promotion of hate 
against identifiable groups.
Our justice system does not allow lawmakers to legislate tolerance. The 
former Soviet Union experimented with this type of inter-cultural policy but its 
former member-states are faced with more conflict now, especially in the former 
Central Asian republics, than at any other time in their history. Politicians and 
judges have only one option, and that is to penalize intolerance in a precise and 
enforceable manner, especially when it is being bred in a controlled and 
institutionalized environment like a high school classroom.
The drawn-out New Brunswick Human Rights Commission inquiry into the 
conduct of Moncton teacher Malcolm Ross indicates that freedom of expression 
is not in danger of being eroded by the courts. The inquiry found as facts that 
various people had complained to School Board No. 15, which had employed Mr.
4(Moncton: Stronghold, 1987).
Ross since 1978, that his views on Judaism bred hatred against members of that 
faith. The accusations themselves were never precise enough to charge Mr. Ross 
with promoting hate, even following publication of two of his books, Web of Deceit 
in 1978, and Spectre o f Power in 1987.
The inquiry was first established in 1988 but could not even begin hearings 
until 1991 because of constant challenges to the jurisdiction of the inquiry by Ross 
and the defendant. The views of Ross would be examined under s. 5(1) of the 
New Brunswick Human Rights Act,5 since successive Attorneys General in the 
province did not see grounds to prosecute Ross under the Criminal Code 
provisions for promoting hate.
By using human rights legislation rather than the Criminal Code to seek 
redress, the complainant may have actually found a more effective road to 
articulate his case. The various Charter arguments which inevitably challenge hate 
prosecutions under the Criminal Code suggest that human rights statutes are a 
more appropriate venue for discussing hate-related activities. As well, inquiries 
such as the one struck in the Ross case could not in any way be considered witch 
hunts. Counsel for the complainant went to great lengths to establish mens rea, 
which is essential to proving that Ross was “wilfully” promoting hatred against an 
identifiable group.
Inquiry Chair Brian Bruce submitted an excellent level-headed decision on 28 
August 1991. It should be required reading for anyone interested in the intricacies 
of human rights law. In his decision, Bruce explained that the role of human 
rights inquiry into the complainant’s charges gave him no choice but to define the 
legislation in the broadest possible terms:
The courts in support of the general objectives of human rights legislation have 
given the various specific provisions within the legislation a broad rather than 
narrow application.6
He went on to cite Justice McIntyre in the Supreme Court of Canada decision 
Ontario Human Rights Commission & Theresa O ’Malley v. Simpson-Sears in his 
description of the purpose of human rights legislation:
Legislation of this type is of a special nature, not quite constitutional but certainly 
more than the ordinary -  and it is for the courts to seek out its purpose and give 
it effect.7
In an interesting twist, the party against which the complaint was made was
5R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H -ll.
6Attis v. Board of Education of District 15 (1991), 121 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Attis v. New Brunswick
School District No. IS) 15 C.H.R.R. D/339 (Human Rights Board of Inquiry) at 30.
not Malcolm Ross as one would expect, but School Board No. 15, which had been 
accused of providing a forum for Mr. Ross to spread his thoughts on the Jewish 
faith, despite numerous complaints lodged against him.
In the rural central Alberta town of Eckville, teacher Jim Keegstra was 
charged with promoting hate in his classroom during a long career as a social 
studies teacher. In comparison to the Ross case, there was ample evidence that 
Keegstra had spoken of Jews in the most uncomplimentary of terms possible. 
However, his conviction under the hate promotion clauses of the Criminal Code 
was never conclusive until last year when the Supreme Court of Canada, by a 
margin of 4-3, decided that the Code did not place unnecessary limits on freedom 
of expression.8
The minority ruling in the case is also central to understanding the trade-offs 
between freedom of expression and reasonable limits. As Justice McLachlin wrote 
in her dissent:
The evil of hate propaganda is beyond doubt9... The danger here is not so much 
that the legislation will deter those bent on promoting hatred... The danger is 
rather that the legislation may have a chilling effect on legitimate activities 
important to our society by subjecting innocent persons to constraints bom  out of 
a fear of the criminal process.10
If we can learn anything from the Ross and Keegstra cases, it is that Attorneys- 
General and Crown prosecutors are in no hurry to use the Criminal Code to stop 
the promotion of hate. As already noted, Ross spread his message free of 
harassment outside of the classroom for fully 16 years. Even after evidence 
mounted against him, the New Brunswick Attorney General chose not to permit 
a prosecution under the Criminal Code.
When the Alberta Court of Appeal struck down the original verdict in R. v. 
Keegstra,11 the Alberta Attorney-General was reluctant to appeal the case further 
and only did so after mounting pressure from groups and individuals affected by 
Keegstra’s bile. One could argue that their presence in the debate constituted a 
highly emotional voice in what should have remained a rational legal question. 
However, it would have been surprising if these groups had not taken part in the 
campaign to bring the Keegstra case to the Supreme Court in view of the previous 
conviction.
*R V. Keegstra (1990), 1 C.R. (4th) 129 (S.C.C.).
9Ibid. at 222.
10Ibid. at 258.
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This does not excuse the fact that penal law, by its very nature, can be coercive 
and unnerving in its application to regulate rights. Therefore, restraint should 
remain a cornerstone of criminal law. Despite the legal challenges mounted by 
Keegstra and Ross, it is yet to be proven that their Charter rights were infringed 
by the Criminal Code or the New Brunswick Human Rights Act respectively.
The provision requiring the consent of a provincial Attorney-General before 
charges can be laid under ss. 318 to 320 and 281 of the Criminal Code has been 
quite an effective safeguard in protecting accused hate promoters from legal 
harassment.12 In fact, it has been convincingly argued that this provision could 
be seen as an obstacle to justice for minority groups seeking an end to 
discrimination under s. 15 of the Charter.
It thus seems that society’s work in building tolerance through the legal system 
should be directed primarily through human rights legislation with its emphasis on 
public inquiry rather than the Criminal Code. Our experiment in this regard in the 
case of Malcolm Ross shows us that human rights statutes do not necessarily 
legislate tolerance, but instead help combat the attitudes which support 
discrimination.13
The most important challenge before civil libertarians and all societal groups 
is to recognize that rights are never absolute. Rights are given strength through 
the law, and therefore can be regulated through law in reasonable circumstances 
as prescribed in s. 1 of the Charter. 14  Furthermore, the will must exist within the 
legal and political systems to recognize that Canada’s multicultural heritage is 
protected as a fundamental component of our constitution. Wilful attempts to 
undermine this basic fact should be scrutinized by some form of legal instrument. 
This does not necessarily mean that prosecution under the Criminal Code is 
imminent, but that freedom of expression cannot simply exist without a system of 
redress for those groups who feel besieged by the hatemonger’s message.
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